"Company" security is still user security as far as I'm concerned, and unless you have a department that works full-time on nothing but the security framework full-time, I wouldn't trust it as far as I can throw it, based on many, many years of experience. In most companies, the security framework is something handled by one or more people whose
real job is something "more important". Plus user-designed security isn't integrated into the core
J2EE deployment mechanisms and APIs the way that the one Sun designed is. Which means that it almost certainly depends on nobody ever, ever screwing up on their security function calls. Assuming that they knew enough to put them there to begin with. Which isn't a safe assumption once the app enters maintenance and gets dumped on junior programmers who may be outsourced from a different provider than the original coders.
How can I tell it's not the J2EE standard? Because until JEE, there was no way to force a login on a page - only by navigating to a secured page. So a page with a "login" button on it immediately rings alarm bells. Even then, hanging complex functionality off the login button is a high-risk activity. My logins are extremely spartan, because anything beyond the basic login form is a potential security exploit.
I tend to be harsh about security for a reason. I've worked a long time with webapps, and in all those years, I've never ever seen a user-designed security framework that wasn't hackable, and most of them could be hacked by unskilled personnel in under 10 minutes, no matter what "genius" invented the system. I know of one case where potentially not only could the primary webapp's database be completly exploited, but so could every other customer on that server as well - and it wasn't even an SQL injection attack. Yesterday I got a query from someone wanting to know why his daughter got "password changed" email from a bank that she doesn't even have an account with. The day before I got a blatantly obvious malware package from LinkedIn. And I'm not talking spoofs - we tracked this stuff back to registered corporate resources. Supposedly companies of this size spend more time and money on security than that.
Oh wait. They spent it all on expensive buzzword frameworks and big-name Dogbert consulting companies. Then they outsourced the work to the cheapest bidder and took the leftover cash and handed it out as executive bonuses.
But I'm not bitter. After all, it's only my financial life and reputation that they're doing this with.